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difference between human beings and the rest of the living world is 
less significant than we thought even a few decades ago . One of the 
chief aspects of the commonality of all living things is the common 
experience of all corporeal beings of ‘being in the world’ . ‘All life is 
incorporated,’ remarks Bakke . All life derives pleasure and suffers 
from its corporeality . This experience has allowed us to set about 
expanding ethics to include other living (i .e . corporeal) beings . If 
we achieve the revolution to which the transhumanists aspire and 
become virtual beings, if we discard our corporeality, then in all 
probability we shall fall back into anthropocentrism, or more likely 
into a new form of it, since the new bodiless human will not be the 
same sort of human being . I dare say that a better understanding 
of  our biological bodies would allow us to expand our ethics in 
a more logical and coherent manner, while the lack of a biological 
body would result in ethical regression .
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1. The body in the world of artefacts
A human being experiences the effects not only 
of the forces of nature, but also of factors that 
(s)he himself / herself has produced . More than 
a century and a half has passed since artificial 
images of the photographic type were invented, 
and people have been surrounded by them ever 
since . Sometimes they surround people like fog 
or rain, sometimes like a clinging spider’s web, 
and frequently they inspire images of happiness 
and clarity . The time is past when this medium 
was associated with a  window into the world 
of  ‘historic truth’, but this does not diminish 
our interest in ‘light writing’, as is proved by the 
multitude of  scholarly conferences on the 
subject . In 2014 a new periodical, Anthropology 
and Photography, began to come out in London .
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are often discussed in the context of the social sciences’ turn towards 
materiality and corporeality . Daniel Miller provides a new meaning 
for Hegel’s concept of ‘objectification’ [Miller 1987: 19–82] . In order 
to realise and understand itself, the subject creates (alienates or 
objectifies) an object and externalises it in material or ideal form . 
Representations of  this kind may use various vectors — visible 
figurative forms, audible sonic rhythms, kinaesthetically palpable bodily 
motions, impressions of taste or smell . Such an object is apprehended 
or acquired by the subject, and both parties are changed in this process 
of production and consumption . The dialectic of  subject and object 
consists in the subject’s becoming its own object and returning to itself 
at another level, and this continues cyclically, as each objectification 
brings about a new modification of the subject . An important aspect 
of this is the particular connection of the parties: the subject is never 
the subject per se, but is always defined by its relationship to the object . 
a culture has no subject, neither in the image of a particular person 
nor in society as a whole, because the subject should be considered as 
both the creator and the creation of the culture .
The materiality of artefacts is a characteristic of objects in their effect 
on each other and on human beings . People organise the world 
through their artefacts, and by this very process human beings are 
organised . Does society consist of  people (together with their 
activities, institutions and ideas) or should the objects arising in the 
course of their activities also be included in the social world? And 
if objects are to be allowed into the social reality, how are they to be 
interpreted — as symbols of  social relations (signs) or as things 
endowed with independent activity? The material turn is connected 
with the recognition that objects are not just signs and that not only 
people are active . People organise objects, and find themselves 
organised by them, and there emerges in people’s behaviour what 
Miller calls ‘the humility of things’ . ‘In a sense artefacts have a certain 
“humility” in that they are reticent about revealing their power to 
determine what is socially conceivable’ [Miller 1994: 409] . Artefacts 
form a wider field than the signs of language .
Materiality is not an original characteristic of objects, historically it 
is formed in objectifications . Materiality and substantiality are 
identified in popular discourse, but they are not the same thing . 
‘Substantiality’ is a  question of  the thresholds of  our perceptions . 
Objectification is a  movement to mediate the unmediated . But in 
reality people encounter not only that which bears the imprint 
of media, but also that which is unmediated, that which continues 
to live its own life in objects .
Materiality is a product of becoming, it is a product of  the mate-
rialisation of  the immaterial . As a  term, ‘immaterial’ is preferable 
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to  the negative ‘non-material’ . ‘The immaterial’ is not anti-
materiality, it is an expression of the presence of ‘another materiality’, 
whereas the ‘non-material’ only embodies the idea of  an absence 
of qualities . For example, people might use the expression ‘a non-
alcoholic drink’, but in this case they are, precisely, saying what there 
is not in the drink, and not saying what there is — water, sugar, 
vitamins, salts, etc .
Materiality itself is many-layered, and research into the technologies 
of  sociocultural objectification shows that the division of  culture 
into material and non-material (substantial and palpable, on the one 
hand, and insubstantial and impalpable on the other) leads us up 
the blind alley of  dualistic oppositions . This can be avoided if we 
learn to speak of the materiality of ‘non-material’ culture, discover 
its origin as that of artefacts on the whole . As Marshall McLuhan 
remarked, there are palpable things, ‘hardware’, such as bats and 
balls, knives and forks, railways, space ships, radios and computers . 
There are impalpable things, ‘sofware’, such as theories and scientific 
laws, philosophical systems, forms and styles of  painting, poetry, 
music, etc . ‘All are equally artefacts, all equally human, all equally 
susceptible to analysis,’ and we must be prepared for all our 
accustomed distinctions between sciences and arts, things and ideas, 
physics and metaphysics to lose their former rigour [McLuhan, 
McLuhan 1988] .
An art lover might be alarmed at the proposition of regarding a work 
of art as an artefact, but this is not an attempt to deprecate art . On 
the contrary, art wins from this approach: we can understand its 
effect better .
Artefacts form the environment in which human corporeality is 
shaped . The idea of ‘the body’ may take part in various discourses . 
It may, for example, be a  metaphor for ‘human incompleteness’, 
when we are told that ‘this is only the body, there are the soul and 
the spirit besides .’ It may be a  metaphor for ‘human ontological 
integrity’, when we are told that the multifaceted nature of 
corporeality leads people to speak of ‘the body of the spirit, the body 
of the soul, and, finally, the body of the body .’ But in any case it will 
be right to regard the body as the means by which nature becomes 
a human being .
What role did technology play in the coming into existence of the 
human being and of culture?
Researchers consider that at the root of the turn towards materiality 
we find the works of  the anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan 
[Ingold 1999: 411–53; Krutkin 2015: 187–99] . As a palaeontologist, 
Leroi-Gourhan relied on the results of the most diverse disciplines, 
from archaeology and biology to sociology and art history [Leroi-
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technology as the collective name for everything that works by 
mediation, when the principle of circular motion is used . He believed 
that the underlying principles of  technology were present at the 
beginning of  life and evolved gradually over time; technology is 
a factor in the biological dimension of humanity . Technology is older 
not only than labour, but even older than humanity . The exciting 
picture of the evolution of life drawn by the scholar — from fish to 
computers — cannot fail to impress the reader by its scale .
The ancestors of man evolved in parallel with other mammals until 
they began to walk upright, at which point there was a  sudden 
change . It was not cranial capacity but the vertical position and the 
evolution of movement that played the decisive part in anthropo-
genesis . It would be a mistake to think that the specifics of humanity 
are that humans use tools and animals do not . In Leroi-Gourhan’s 
opinion, the specifics of  the human relation to the world are that 
people can separate tools from their bodies, whereas animals’ tools 
(and they are perfect in their way) are merged with their bodies 
[Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 237] .
The liberation of the hands from their locomotive function caused 
the emergence of  two important connections . The first is the pair 
‘hand and tool’ . The liberation of  the mouth from the function 
of seizing and holding prey caused the realisation of another pair, 
‘face and language’ . The motor functions of the hands and face are 
decisive factors in the emergence of  gesture, which is on the one 
hand connected with material action, and on the other with language 
and the aural symbol [Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 187] . The hand is not 
a hand per se, it is what it does when using tools, and the capacity 
for language too only exists in the process of speech .
The making of  stone tools, he considers, is a  bridge between the 
animal world and the human world, in which tools may be separated 
from the body . Gesture begins as a chain of operations with tools, 
and this chain is at the same time an expression of knowledge and 
ability, and here the human being’s movements and perceptions are 
linked .
Gestures of this sort go beyond the task of adapting to a situation, 
they are capable of  creating their own situation . a  tool which is 
‘liberated’ from the body does not by any means become an external 
prosthesis, it is connected with the body as before, but it is an 
‘outpouring’ or ‘secretion’ of the anthropoid body and brain [Leroi-
Gourhan 1993: 91] . Using the idea of  gesture, Leroi-Gourhan 
demonstrates that tools and bodies are deeply interpenetrative . Tools 
and bodies invent each other, and this is what lies at the root of the 
triumph over the dualism of the substantial and the insubstantial, 
the material and the immaterial .
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Gesture is not a kind of language, but a part of every language . Our 
speech relies on articulatory gestures . We have no grounds for 
opposing the ‘language of  words’ to the ‘language of  gestures’ . 
Gestures are accompanied by a one-sided semiotic conceptualisation; 
a gesture is not a sign, it is ‘le travail qui précède la constitution du 
signe (du sens) dans la communication’ [italics in the original . — 
V.K.] [Kristeva 1968: 50] .
According to Leroi-Gourhan, the meaning of a gesture consists in 
the work that it does, without reference to the meanings that the 
parties to the communication have available to them, with no need 
for a symbolic code or of a recipient to ‘read’ the gesture as a sign . 
What is important from the palaeontological point of  view is not 
the opposition between gesture and speech, but the discovery of their 
origin from a common root .
His thoughts on technology depended on a  huge archive of  de-
scriptions of  technical processes — forging, trimming, casting, 
shaping — which at first were achieved by manpower, then by the 
power of animals, air, wind, water and fire .
The invention of the wheeled cart, the plough, the windmill and the 
sailing ship should be seen not only as the impulse of the human spirit, 
but also as a biological evolutionary phenomenon [Leroi-Gourhan 
1993: 246], as mutations of  the external sociocultural material 
organism, which is a continuation of the physiological human body .
Technical contrivances, in Leroi-Gourhan’s opinion, are at the same 
time tools and gestures, organised in a  particular order, and this 
syntax provides series of actions with both stability and flexibility 
[Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 231–3] .
The forces of  nature and the artefacts of  culture that act on 
humanity  — where will they lead? Leroi-Gurhan’s answer — to 
placing humanity on an evolutionary scale between its wild ancestor 
and a spiritualised angel — is a romantic dream . Humanity’s double 
may be not an angel, but a perfect machine, an automised robot . He 
wrote that ‘[t]he nightmare picture of robots pursuing human beings 
in a forest of mechanical tubes will come true only to the extent that 
other human beings will have regulated the robots’ automatic system’ 
[Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 249] .
Production and language, i .e . tools and signals, albeit in an 
embryonic form, are nevertheless present among our elder brethren . 
But what is not present in the world of animals? They have no writing 
or reading of symbols [Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 188] . He has in mind 
that writing that left traces 30,000 years ago on the walls of caves; 
he has many works devoted to them .
Is it true that these cave-paintings were a  hunting manual, an 
encyclopaedia of the animal world, exercises of ancient artists? Leroi-
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representations of myths . They do not in the least resemble artistic 
copies of  reality . They were the work of  people who used these 
images to study the art of sight and the art of speech, and learnt to 
connect the image and the word .
Marie-José Mondzain, a  key author in contemporary visual 
research, thinks that it is wrong to consider images as derived from 
vision . ‘We do not see the world because we have eyes’ [Mondzain 
2010: 308] . Leroi-Gourhan writes about this too: ‘Two languages, 
both springing from the same source, came into existence at the 
two poles of the operating field — the language of hearing, which 
is linked with the development of  the sound-coordinating areas, 
and the language of  sight, which in turn is connected with the 
development of the gesture-coordinating areas, the gestures being 
translated into graphic symbols’ [Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 195] . 
Mondzain also makes an important methodological observation 
for our question: ‘Leroi-Gourhan (1964–5) is no doubt the one 
who has come closest to what philosophy might be able to gain 
from this testimony when the expert renounces analogical fictions’ 
[Mondzain 2010: 312] .
2. Image as artefact.  
From mythography to digital representation
In Lev Manovich’s words, we need to learn to read the word 
‘photography’ anew . ‘“Photographic” today is really photo-GRAPHIC, 
the photo providing only an initial layer for the overall graphical mix’ 
[Manovich 2006] .
A photographic image is an artefact, although it may seem that 
figures appear by themselves on the sensitive emulsion . But the 
image does not appear because we have forgotten to cover the lens . 
And to set about ‘light writing’ it is not enough just to give the 
camera to the cameraman, we need him / her to have a particular 
vision . This is the idea of  the psychologist James Gibson: besides 
direct perception, people have ‘visual perception’, when people cross 
from the visible world to the perceptual field [Gibson 1979] .
The philosopher Ortega y Gasset also has a picturesque description 
of  this transition . Let us imagine that we are looking at a  garden 
through a window-pane . Our eyes have to get used to it . What we 
want to see is the garden, that is what we focus our attention on, 
and our gaze passes through the glass without stopping . Seeing the 
garden and seeing the glass in the window are two incompatible 
processes: the one excludes the other, and each requires a different 
adjustment of our gaze . In everyday life priority and importance will 
be accorded to reality, such as it is outside the window . To cross 
over to visual perception (to the photographic representation, but 
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not only that) we have to bear in mind the glass through which we 
are looking [Ortega y Gasset 1928: 17] .
Onto this screen (which may be imaginary) is projected the 
representation of what we see . There is an easy way of crossing over 
to visual perception, and that is the simple gesture of  making 
a square with the fingers on the plane of the imagined frame . This 
is every camera operator’s gesture .
The image is an artefact like other artefacts, it is an objectification, 
the product of the mediation of the non-mediated, a materialisation 
of the immaterial . These characteristics are applicable to any image .
Like other artefacts, images are a means of organising the world . It 
is also true that they organise humanity from the direction 
of perception . This is done by the artefacts themselves, they enter 
experience as endued with a  particular affordance (Gibson’s 
neologism) . Artefacts (things, images, symbols) in connection one 
with another form the cultural landscape . The materiality of  the 
landscape lies in its action, its capacity for participating in the 
formation of people’s identity .
The materiality of the image is connected with substantial parameters: 
thick cardboard, and the frame in which the photograph is mounted . 
However, the materiality of the photograph is not just a matter of the 
substance of  the cardboard, but in the work of  the medium . 
Photography works, because the materialisation of the immaterial is 
realised in it when it allows something to be seen through itself . In 
Elizabeth Edwards’s words, ‘photography as an artefact is not only 
the scene for human action and interpretation, it is an inalienable 
environment for the interpretation itself’ [Edwards 2002: 67] . Without 
this sort of transparency it does not cross the horizon of the material, 
and remains immanent . Sometimes this transparency is characterised 
as ‘virtuality’ . The concepts of the real and the virtual have their own 
history, but is it right completely to deprive the virtual of the status 
of the real? The opinion of W . J . Mitchell, an author who stands and 
the beginning of  the visual turn, is typical . He remarks that ‘The 
metaphor of “virtuality” seemed a powerful one as we first struggled 
to understand the implications of digital information, but it has long 
outlived its usefulness . <…> It makes more sense to recognize that 
invisible, intangible, electromagnetically encoded information 
establishes new types of relationships among physical events occurring 
in physical places’ [italics in the original . — V.K.] [Mitchell 2004: 4] .
The first images, in the opinion of  Vilém Flusser, functioned as 
signposts in the world of myth . The mythographic system of signposts 
was the platform for palaeolithic art . It served as a map for a very 
long time, but with time the images lose the power to give directions, 
and conceal the world to such an extent that man begins to live as 
a  function of  the images that (s)he has created . Flusser noted that 
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function of the signposts that they were at the time of the first myths . 
However, the ancient images contained within themselves the way 
out of  the impasse . Alphabets were composed from their graphic 
components, as if from pixel elements . The invention of  written 
language was a means of breaking through the barrier and discovering 
a new way of orientation . Phonemic speech was recorded in suitable 
linear graphemes, and alphabetic writing came into being . Five 
thousand years ago, in conditions of  settled habitation and the 
development of metalworking, the tasks of writing down the sacrifices 
made to the gods, peoples’ debts and military victories acquired 
relevance . Texts were invented in order to demystify images and 
purge them of magic . But is not history going round in circles? Flusser 
thinks that when there is an excessive number of  texts, they stop 
providing directions . The function of the technogenic image is to free 
humanity from the necessity of  linear thought, replacing historical 
consciousness with a  second-degree magical consciousness and 
conceptual capacity with second-degree imagination . The invention 
of  photography, from Flusser’s point of  view, is as historically 
significant event as the invention of writing [Flusser 1983] .
The representation of  the world appears within the bounds of  the 
photographic frame . Framing declares the world to be visible, where 
the limits of the visible direct the beholder also to the invisible . This 
is what Hubert Damisch notes: ‘One forgets, in the process, that the 
image the first photographers were hoping to seize, and the very 
latent image which they were able to reveal and develop, were in no 
sense naturally given’ [italics in the original . — V.K.] [Damisch 1978: 
71] . Approaching photography as an artefact allows us to bring 
together the graphic and the photographic, and removes the brusque 
opposition between analogue and digital representation . The 
transition from the visible to the invisible is not the capacity of all 
photography, but that of ‘good’ photography . From this point of view 
a  good photograph is one which is imbued with a  particular 
transparency, which shows the invisible, which allows something to 
be seen through itself .
Photography nowadays is ceasing to be regarded as an historical 
document illustrating an existing historical event . In Favero’s words, 
instead of being looked at as an object, a photograph should be used 
as an object to be looked through . Photography is a type of passage, 
a  channel of  connection between objects, history and people . 
Photography is the inspirer of  the history that may come to pass, 
and not a visual representation of the history that has already been 
[Favero 2017] .
We do not find in photography simply the reflection of objects: here 
a  particular version of  the world is composed of  light and shade 
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by  technological means, and a  visual component of  the cultural 
landscape is formed . It is hard to ignore this in research on society 
today . As the English anthropologist Daniel Miller bears witness, 
every day there are about 350  million photographs posted on 
Facebook, about fifty-five million on Instagram, about 400 million 
on WhatsApp, and about 450 million on Snapchat [Miller 2015] .
Photography is fragile and vulnerable in that it cannot do anything 
about the frivolous haste of  those photographers who do not aim 
for transparency in their photographs and care nothing for the 
transition from the visible to the invisible . Neither can it do anything 
about the viewer’s choice of the screen of the visible field on which, 
in one way or another, the viewers project the image .
3. The photographic camera.  
The theatre of photographic gestures
Damisch notes that one must not imagine the black box of  the 
camera to be ‘neutrality’ or its settings unprejudiced [Damisch 1978: 
71] . As a  tool, this box is connected with human gestures . Many 
researchers have written about this .
The camera, as the instrument of photography, contains within itself 
the means to codify and develop the photographic gesture . The event 
of  the gesture evolves within the camera, and this is facilitated 
by a complex mechanism of bolted joints, cogs, transmissions, guides 
for the movement of  the lens, shutter mechanisms, mirrors and 
prisms . This is noted in Parshchikov’s observations: ‘The modern 
camera is a smoothly organised miniaturised theatre, democratic in 
the ancient sense, and relatively accessible;’ ‘the visual potential 
of  the stage equipment of  the theatre almost coincides with the 
working possibilities of  the lens . Brightness and darkness are 
regulated, mixed and quantified by a  turn of  the aperture stop .’ 
Regulating the mixture of light and darkness produces the mediation 
of the unmediated, and framing produces the materialisation of the 
immaterial . It was noticed long ago that a big enlargement reveals 
the optical unconscious . Parshchikov writes that ‘the camera chooses 
the living space for its intended hero by means of  the magic ring 
of  the depth of  field, which links the functional quantity of  the 
necessary light with the occupation of space . This is the collaboration 
of field and focusing, their existential parameter’ [Parshchikov s .d .] . 
We use light as a dramatic force symbolising the distribution of good 
and evil in the world .
As (s)he looks through the view-finder, the photographer waits for 
the moment when the picture will look like what (s)he thinks about 
it . (S)he is present in the frame, because the camera fixes his / her 
decision to press the button [Berger 2013] . The photograph and his / 
her viewer think in images .
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its codes, not only acquiring the necessary gestures, but also 
extending one’s bodily experience . People make sense of the world 
not only with logic and language, but also with body and feelings . 
As John Berger remarks, ‘looking brings closer’, and there is 
a connection between ‘displacement and vision’; he states ironically 
that there is ‘a certain parallel between the act of piloting a bike and 
the act of drawing’ [Berger 2011] . The same thing can be heard in 
Flusser’s words: the photo-gesture is an act of pursuit in which the 
photographer and his / her camera are fused into an indivisible 
function [Flusser 1983] .
Technology and corporeality, in Leroi-Gourhan’s opinion, can only 
be understood as a  unity . Technology is both tools and gestures, 
organised in a  particular sequence, and this syntax bestows upon 
series of actions both stability and flexibility [Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 
231–3] . A  gesture begins as a  realisable intention, as a  chain of 
operations performed on the world with tools, and this chain is at 
the same time an expression of knowledge and ability, where human 
movement and perception are linked .
A person is involved in the process of the genesis of photographic 
materiality in his / her entire corporeality, as François Laruelle 
writes: ‘Before the eye, the hand, the torso are implicated in it, 
perhaps it is from the most obscure and the most irreflexive depth 
of the body that the photographic art departs’ [Laruelle 2011: 11] . 
Laruelle’s question, ‘How exactly does the photographer, through 
his body, his eye, his camera, relate himself to the World?’ [Ibid .: 8] 
could be extended: how can a  person looking at a  photograph or 
screen correlate himself / herself with the world? (S)he does not do 
so simply through the information received, but through the 
participation in the image that (s)he experiences — when (s)he is 
not acting, but acted upon . Laruelle’s ideas about non-photography 
are no more an attempt to do away with what we know about 
photography than non-Euclidian geometry renders Euclid’s figures 
unnecessary . What is new is neither a new way of producing photo-
graphs nor new ways of ‘thinking about photography’ . It is a question 
of a new ‘thinking with photography’ .
References
Berger J ., Bento’s Sketchbook . London: Verso, 2011, 167 pp .
Berger J ., Understanding a  Photograph, 2nd ed . London: Penguin, 2013, 
219 pp .
Damisch H ., ‘Five Notes for a Phenomenology of the Photographic Image’, 
October, 1978, vol . 5, pp . 70–2 .
Edwards E ., ‘Material Beings: Objecthood and Ethnographic Photographs’, 
Visual Studies, 2002, vol . 17, no . 1, pp . 67–75 .
42FORUM FOR ANTHROPOLOGY AND CULTURE 2019  No 15
Favero P ., ‘“The Transparent Photograph”: Reflections on the Ontology 
of Photographs in a Changing Digital Landscape’, Anthropology and 
Photography, 2017, no . 7, pp . 1–16 .
Flusser V ., Für eine Philosophie der Fotografie . Göttingen: European 
Photography, 1983, 58 SS .
Gibson J ., The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception . Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1979, XIV+332 pp .
Ingold T ., ‘“Tools for the Hand, Language for the Face”: An Appreciation 
of  Leroi-Gourhan’s Gesture and Speech’, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 1999, vol . 30, no . 4, 
pp . 411–53 .
Kristeva J ., ‘Le geste, pratique ou communication?’, Langages, 1968, no . 10, 
pp . 48–64 .
Krutkin V . L ., ‘Materialnost sotsiokulturnoy zhizni v antropologii Andre 
Lerua-Gurana [The Materiality of  Sociocultural Life in the 
Anthropology of  André Leroi-Gourhan]’, Zhurnal sotsiologii 
i  sotsialnoy antropologii, 2015, vol .  18, no .  4(81), pp .  187–99 . 
(In Russian) .
Laruelle F ., The Concept of Non­Photography . Falmouth, UK: Urbanomic; 
New York: Sequence, 2011, VIII+143+VIII+143 pp .
Leroi-Gourhan A ., Gesture and Speech . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, 
431 pp .
Manovich L ., ‘Image Future’, 2006 . <http://manovich .net/content/04-
projects/048-image-future/45_article_2006 .pdf> .
McLuhan M ., McLuhan E ., Laws of  Media: The New Science . Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1988, XI+252 pp .
Miller D ., Material Culture and Mass Consumption . Oxford, UK; New York: 
Basil Blackwell, 1987, VIII+240 pp .
Miller D ., ‘Artefacts and the Meaning of Things’, Ingold T . (ed .), Companion 
Encyclopedia of Anthropology . London; New York: Routledge, 1994, 
pp . 396–419 .
Miller D ., ‘Photography in the Age of  Snapchat’, Anthropology and 
Photography, 2015, no . 1, pp . 1–17 .
Mitchell W . J ., Me++: The Cyborg Self and the Networked City . Boston: MIT 
Press, 2004, 259 pp .
Mondzain M .-J ., ‘What Does Seeing an Image Mean?’, Journal of  Visual 
Culture, 2010, vol . 9, no . 3, pp . 307–15 .
Ortega y Gasset J ., La deshumanización del arte; Ideas sobre la novella, 
2a ed. Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1928, 161 pp .
Parshchikov A . M ., ‘Snimayu ne ya, snimaet kamera’ [It Is Not Me Who Is 
Shooting, It Is a Camera], s .d . <http://parshchikov .ru/nulevaya-
stepen-morali/snimayu-ne-ya-snimaet-kamera> . (In Russian) .
